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Security risk management: A psychometric map of expert knowledge structure 
 
David J. Brooks 
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Edith Cowan University 
Email: d.brooks@ecu.edu.au 
 
Abstract 
The security industry operates within a diverse and multi-disciplined knowledge base, with 
risk management as a fundamental knowledge domain within security to mitigate its risks. 
Nevertheless, there has been limited research in understanding and mapping security expert 
knowledge structures within security risk management to consider if parts of security risk 
management are unique from more general risk management. This interpretive study applied 
a technique of multidimensional scaling (MDS) to develop and present a psychometric map 
within the knowledge domain of security risk management, validated with expert interviews. 
 
The psychometric MDS security risk management concept map presented the expert 
knowledge structure of security risk management, demonstrating the inclusive and spatial 
locality of significant security risk concepts, conceptual complexity and uniqueness of the 
domain and the importance of the concept threat. Understanding security experts’ consensual 
knowledge of security risk may allow improved understanding of threat-based risk, the issue 
with applying probabilistic risk analysis against antagonist events, and improved teaching and 
learning within this knowledge domain. 
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Introduction 
Over the past two decades, the concept of risk management as a formal discipline has 
emerged throughout the private and public sectors (Aven, 2008; Power, 2007). Risk 
management has now become a well established discipline, with its own body of knowledge 
and domain practitioners. States worldwide have their own risk management standards and in 
many of these states, it is the senior company executives who have responsibility to ensure 
that appropriate risk management practices meet internal and external compliance 
requirements (D. J Brooks, 2009a). Nevertheless, many of these standards and compliance 
requirements only consider risk management, not security risk management. Security risk 
management may be considered unique from other forms of risk management, as many of the 
more generic risk models lack key concepts necessary for effective design, application and 
mitigation of security risks. 
 
In general, security may be considered assured freedom from poverty or want, precautions 
taken to ensure against theft, espionage, or a person or thing that secures or guarantees 
(Angus & Roberston, 1992). According to Fischer and Green (Fischer & Green, 2004, p. 21) 
“security implies a stable, relatively predictable environment in which an individual or group 
may pursue its ends without disruption or harm and without fear of such disturbance or 
injury.” Security practice areas may be considered public security (state policing), private 
security, national security, private military security or many other terms, but convergence of 
these areas are increasing in the current social and political environment. As Zedner stated 
“scholars have tended to think about security within their immediate discipline and in 
detachment from one another” (2009, p. 3). Such diversity may result in a society that has no 
clear understanding of what security is, moreover, there is a divergence of interests from 
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many stakeholders (Manunta, 1999). Nevertheless, the security industry incorporates diverse, 
multi-disciplined and capricious practitioners, originating from many disciplines; however, 
security risk management is a core skill for these security practitioners (D.J. Brooks, 2009b), 
resulting in the importance of this type of study. 
 
Background 
World exposure to terrorist attacks in Mumbai (2009), Jakarta (2009; 2004), Glasgow (2007), 
London (2007; 2006; 2005), Russia (2004), Spain (2004), Bali (2002) and New York (2001) 
has raised social concern over the ability of governments to protection its citizens. The 
previous Australian Prime Minister, Mr. John Howard, stated that the 2002 Bali attacks had 
touched all Australians, resulting in Federal Government committing an additional 
A$3.1billion to deal with the terrorist threat. The financial impact of the 11th September 2001 
cost the United States 0.75 percent of US GDP or US$75 billion (Howard, 2004). These 
issues have raised both national and international requirement for security that can effectively 
protect its citizen at a reasonable cost, achieved to some degree through the use of security 
risk management. 
 
Within the context of this study, security was considered within a commercial, organisational 
or private context for the protection of people, information and assets. This view was 
supported by ASIS International (2000), when indicating that organisational security 
management is a distinct field, separate from police or justice domains. Otherwise, with the 
breadth of applied security domains, there could be a divergence of these distinct knowledge 
categories. 
 
Over the past two decades, the concept of risk management has flourished throughout the 
private and public sectors (Aven, 2008; Power, 2007). Security, like other management 
disciplines, has embraced the principles and application of risk management, in particular, a 
probabilistic risk approach to measure risk and aid decision-making (Standards Australia, 
2006; Talbot & Jakeman, 2008). Such an approach has been supported by many, who view 
probabilistic risk as a tool that produces rational, objective and informed options from which 
decisions may be made (Garlick, 2007; Morgan & Henrion, 1990; Talbot & Jakeman, 2008). 
However, many argue that probabilistic risk is inadequate for delivering (expected) rational 
measurements of security risks in what may be considered an increasingly uncertain and 
changing environment (Bier, 1999; Bier, 2007; L. A. Cox, 2008; Manunta, 2002). 
 
Australia’s approach to security risk management 
There are a number of risk management and security risk management frameworks used by 
the Australian security industry including Australian Standard 4360:2004 Risk Management 
(Standards Australia, 2004a), Handbook 167:2006 Security Risk Management (Standards 
Australia, 2006) and the Risk Management Institute of Australasia Security Risk 
Management Body of Knowledge (SRMBOK) (Talbot & Jakeman, 2008). Australian 
Standard 4360:2004 has now been modified and used as the basis for the International 
Standards Organisation ISO3100:2009 for risk management. 
 
AS ISO 3100:2009 Risk Management 
AS4360 Risk Management (Standards Australia, 2004a) was first published in 1992 and is 
considered “almost a de facto global standard” (Jay, 2005, p. 2), becoming “recognised 
internationally as best practice” (Jones & Smith, 2005, p. 23) on dealing with risk, having 
been used in Canada and the United Kingdom, and translated into Cantonese, Mandarin, 
Japanese, Korean, French and Spanish (Jay, 2005, pp. 2-3). The standard is widely used by 
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security professionals within Australia (Jones & Smith, 2005, p. 23) and became the draft for 
the International Standards Organisation ISO 31000:2009 Risk Management (Standards 
Australia, 2009, p. vi). Many industries use this framework and it has broad application 
across governance, finance, engineering, project management, environmental protection, life 
safety and security. 
 
Standards Australia is Australia’s peak standards organisation, even though they are a public 
company limited by guarantee. Standards Australia is charged by the Australian 
Commonwealth Government to provide general oversight and governance of Australian 
Standards (Standards Australia, n.d.), with four key areas of focus including national and 
international coordination, accreditation of other organisations to produce standards, 
development and update of standards, and design assessment (Standards Australia, 2009). 
 
Australian Standards, as with most standards, are “published documents setting out 
specifications and procedures designed to ensure products, services and systems are safe, 
reliable and consistently perform” (Standards Australia, n.d. p. 2). Such an approach ensures 
that a common language is achieved within an industry, driven by the more progressive parts 
of industry, legislation and community expectations. 
 
AS ISO 31000:2009 Risk Management presents a framework (Figure 1) or process 
(Standards Australia, 2009, p. vi) for the risk management process, beginning with 
establishing the context, where the scope is set and stakeholders are identified. Next the risks 
are assessed, integrating risk identification, analyses and evaluation, and finally risks are 
treated. Concurrently with the risk assessment stages, the process is monitored and reviewed 
and stakeholders are consulted (Standards Australia, 2004b). 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Risk management. 
(Standards Australia, 2004b; Standards Australia, 2009) 
 
What the AS ISO 31000:2009 Risk Management standard does not consider are security risk 
concepts such as threat, vulnerability and criticality, which could be considered significant. 
Such limitations were addressed by Standards Australia when they developed, in consultation 
with academia and the security industry, a specific security risk management standard, 
namely Handbook HB167:2006 Security Risk Management. 
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HB167:2006 Security Risk Management 
As Standards Australia stated in their handbook of security risk management, “the field of 
security risk management is rapidly evolving and as such this Handbook cannot cover all 
aspects and variant approaches” (2004d, p. 2). As the security risk management concept map 
has demonstrated, threat is a critical factor when considering security risk. However, the Risk 
Management AS4360:2004 Standard does not present the concept of threat or other security 
related concepts such as vulnerability, even through Risk Management AS4360:2004 
Standard is a primary resource for security practitioners when considering and applying 
security risk management. 
 
HB167:2006 does “provide a means of better understanding the nature of security threats” 
(Standards Australia, 2006, p. 6). For example, the handbook considers such security risk 
concepts as threat, criticality and vulnerability (Figure 2); all significance and unique to this 
domain of risk management (D. J Brooks, 2009a). 
 
 
Figure 2. HB167:2006 Security risk management framework. 
(Standards Australia, 2006, p. 14) 
 
Other Security Related Australian Standards 
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Finally, within Standards Australia there are other specialised security risk related standards 
covering areas such as business continuity management, health, information security, 
outsourcing risk, finance and corporate governance (Table 1). 
 
Table 1 
Security related Australia Standards 
 
Number Title 
AS4485.1:1997 Security in health care facilities 
AS8000:2003 Corporate governance 
AS ISO/IEC27001:2005 Information technology – Security requirements 
HB141:1999 Risk financing guidelines 
HB221:2003 Business continuity management 
HB240:2000 Guidelines for managing risk in outsourcing 
HB254:2005 Governance, risk management and control assurance 
 
Whilst many of these frameworks have been developed in an attempt to account for risk 
(Aven, 2008; Garlick, 2007), security, like many management disciplines has embraced a 
probabilistic risk analysis approach (Manunta, 2002; Standards Australia, 2006; Talbot & 
Jakeman, 2008). Based on a quantitative, semi-quantitative or qualitative assessment of the 
probability and consequences of future events, probabilistic risk aims to provide security 
managers with a measurement of such risks. Measurements are then used to formulate cost-
effective decisions to shape a future which (attempts to) minimise potential harm, whilst 
captialising on potential opportunities (Garlick, 2007). Nevertheless, it can be suggested that 
such a probabilistic approach does not provide risk management efficacy for security and 
security risk management has to take a greater heuristic approach. 
 
Security Risk Management Body of Knowledge 
A framework that to some degree takes such a heuristic approach is the Risk Management 
Institute of Australasia (RMIA) Security Risk Management Body of Knowledge (SRMBOK). 
The need to increase security risk management knowledge was shown through an Australian 
Federal Government supported initiative with the RMIA, resulting in the Security Risk 
Management Body of Knowledge (Talbot & Jakeman, 2008) guide for practitioners. The 
guide attempts to resolve security risk management elements such as “a framework for 
critical knowledge, competency and practice areas which managers, practitioners, students 
and academics alike can apply to recruit, train, educate and measure performance” (Risk 
Management Institute of Australasia, 2007b, p. 1). Nevertheless, the SRMBOK still does not 
present clear identification of the many components and their interrelationships that could be 
considered security risk management. 
 
Significance of the study 
The risk and security risk management frameworks presented provide a number of structures 
or processes that practitioners may apply; however, they do not provide an in-depth 
understanding of conceptual interrelationship between their parts. In addition, they do not 
address how practitioners may or may not understand such relationships and whether such 
frameworks are consensual in their approach. The psychometric MDS concept mapping 
technique allowed such an understanding to be gained in security risk management. This 
research allowed greater understanding of expert knowledge structure, improved security 
education and curriculum design, and better development of the unique risk domain of 
security risk management. 
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Study objectives 
The study used a psychometric technique to present a consensual concept map of security risk 
management, with a number of discrete research questions, namely: 
• What is the expert knowledge structure and subordinate concepts of security risk 
management, as measured by multidimensional scaling? 
• What is the expert knowledge structure and subordinate concepts of security risk 
management, as measured by interviews? 
• Can a psychometric multidimensional scaling concept map of the security risk 
management knowledge structure and subordinate be developed and presented? 
 
A number of significant outcomes from the study were expected. These outcomes included a 
better understanding of the security risk management knowledge structure, with the more 
significant security risk management knowledge concepts tabulated. Once these more 
significant security risk management concepts were defined, a security risk management 
knowledge and concept map could be developed. 
 
Theoretical framework 
A number of discrete theories supported the interpretive approach applied within the study, 
including knowledge categorisation, concept mapping and multidimensional scaling (MDS). 
These theories provided the inquiry with a scientific foundation. Knowledge categorisation 
included cognitive memory, knowledge categorisation and expertise. Concept mapping and 
MDS supported the development of security knowledge categorisation and subordinate 
concept modelling. 
 
Knowledge Categorisation 
Knowledge may be considered as “facts or experiences known by a person or group of 
people, specific information about a subject” (Angus & Roberston, 1992, p. 557). However, 
according to Clancey, knowledge “is more than written scientific facts and theories” (1997, p. 
285). Knowledge is not discovered, on the contrary, knowledge uses and expands existing 
concepts (Novak, J.D. & Gowin, 1984) and is “a possible state of affairs, either real or 
imaginary” (Eysenck & Keane, 2002, p. 533). As new knowledge is gained, change in 
understanding regarding existing knowledge is achieved. Knowledge is viable (Rennie & 
Gribble, 1999), constructed and is built on previous knowledge. 
 
Knowledge is integral to memory structure – defined as the way in which memory is 
organised, stores and retrieves information. The memory process has a major impact on the 
ability of long term memory (LTM) to retain and retrieve (Eysenck & Keane, 2002) and is a 
complex interactive process (Lockhart & Craik, 1990), which requires knowledge 
categorisation. A person is exposed to information in their everyday life and concurrently 
knowledge has to be economised and abstracted into categories, generally referred to as 
concepts. Concepts may be further divided into implicit (inclusive) or explicit (concrete) 
concepts. These concepts are developed and maintained within long-term memory, however 
there is a cognitive balance between the number and effectiveness of possible concepts. 
Concepts need to be informative, based to a degree on the natural world, economic and 
cohesive (Eysenck & Keane, 2002) and organised into categories (Kellogg, 2003). Similar 
objects are grouped together within a conceptual category and these groupings are generally a 
product of the learner’s environment. There are four theories for concept categorisation, 
being the defining-attribute, prototype, explanation and exemplar-based views (Eysenck & 
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Keane, 2002). The exemplar based view was considered the informing theory supporting 
knowledge categorisation. 
 
Concept Mapping 
Concept maps may be defined as a representation of a state of affair or situation. People may 
attempt to understand the world though developing a concept map of the situation, an idea, 
understanding or principle. Concept maps are thinking tools, that are used to explore different 
aspects of a topic (Wallace, Schirato, & Bright, 1999). Concept maps are generally imaged, 
dynamic and outcome-based simulations that are used in everyday life to think and 
understand the world (Eysenck & Keane, 2002; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Norman, 1983). 
Concept maps enable people to exchange an idea, have shared understanding, provide a 
common language, reach conclusions in decision-making and guide their action (Norman, 
1983; Novak, J.D. & Gowin, 1984). Concept maps may also be referred to as mental maps, 
mind maps, naive theories or folk theories, although these are considered to have different 
characteristics (Bennett & Rolheiser, 2001). 
 
Concept maps attempt to present many aspects of human cognition, from direct 
representation of a physical entity to abstract thought. This view supports concept 
understanding as once a person understands the physical process, most will accept a formal 
model of the process (Bar & Travis, 1991). Representation of abstract thought is far less 
defined and involves implicit knowledge, although these models will “represent aspects of 
external reality” (Borges & Gilbert, 1999, p. 96). According to Eysenck and Keane (2002), 
people will often make discoveries using concept models to simulate aspects of the world, an 
ability that appears to depend on domain specific knowledge based on experience. 
 
Concept maps may take many forms, however within the context of this study they are 
defined as graphical representations of structured knowledge. According to Novak and 
Gowin, concept maps are a “schematic device for representing a set of concept meanings 
embedded in a framework of propositions” (1984, p. 15). The schema may be as a body of 
knowledge, being the summation of domain experts understanding of their knowledge 
structure at that point in time (Trochim, 2005b), or as an individual and how a concept map 
may represent their understanding. Experts tend to define their knowledge within concept 
clusters, which are more extensive, have greater cross concept linkage, increased branches, 
greater hierarchical structure and are more complex (Markham, Mintzes, & Jones, 1994). 
 
There are many methods to develop concept maps, with an enormity of variations that may 
extract, develop and represent concept maps (Ruiz-Primo, Schultz, Li, & Shavelson, 2001). 
According to Johnson-Laird (1983), concept maps may be divided into two distinct types, 
namely physical or conceptual maps. Physical maps provide representation of physical 
systems and research has tended to focus on physical objects, particularly in chemistry, 
physics and biology domains (Johnson-Laird, 1983; J. D. Novak, 1998), whereas conceptual 
maps represent abstract or inclusive knowledge categorisation (Eysenck & Keane, 2002; 
Reisberg, 2001). The study used both quantitative and qualitative techniques to extract and 
present a conceptual psychometric concept map of security risk management. 
 
Multidimensional Scaling 
Multidimensional scaling (MDS) is a statistical technique within the area of multivariate 
analysis. MDS reduces complex n-dimensional data and represents these data within a spatial 
format. The reduction in data complexity through presentation in n-dimensional space allows 
hidden data structure formation — demonstrating object proximity — with proximity being 
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how similar or dissimilar objects are perceived to be (T. F. Cox & Cox, 2000; Kruskal & 
Wish, 1978). MDS commences with a set of objects, which are paired and their similarities 
measured. The distance between pairs of objects are placed into a half matrix format. 
Configurations of points are sought in n-dimensional space, with each point representing an 
object. MDS calculates n-dimensional space configuration where the points distance match 
the paired dissimilarities. The variation in matching defines the different techniques of MDS 
(T. F. Cox & Cox, 2000), with the study using the ALSCAL algorithm: 
 
𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿 = ��    (𝒳𝒳𝛿𝛿𝒳𝒳 − 𝒳𝒳𝒳𝒳𝒳𝒳) 2
𝒳𝒳
� 
 
MDS provided a suitable tool (Smith, 2003) to categorise knowledge concept clusters within 
n dimensions. This method is supported by Ohanian (cited in Stein, 1997), whom stated that 
expertise can be measured as a construct that contains multiple dimensions. MDS facilitated 
the construction of the security consensual map. MDS produced a spatial representation of 
knowledge concept clusters, allowing an analysis of judgements between variables to define 
dimensionality between such variables (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2002). MDS also 
provides a moderate to good construct validity for concept mapping (Hoz, Bowman, & 
Chacham, 1997, p. 928). 
 
The use of MDS in concept mapping was first presented by Trochim (1989b), with later work 
that expanded and detailed the methodology of constructing and presenting concept maps 
(Trochim & Cook, 1994). Nevertheless, Trochim’s (1989b) earlier work considered only 
knowledge structure, a rather restricted approach that contradicted the view of concept 
mapping (1990) and which continued to more recent work (Trochim, 2005b). During this 
period Markham, et al. (1994) used MDS as a method to test the validity of concept mapping, 
considering the previous work by Novak (1990). Markham, et al. (1994) demonstrated that 
concept mapping provided a theoretically valid and powerful tool, and that MDS proved an 
appropriate statistical technique to define concept maps. A view that more recent researchers 
have validated, through additional MDS concept mapping studies (Ruiz-Primo et al., 2001; 
Streveler, Miller, & Boyd, 2001). 
 
Published literature have integrated both concept mapping and MDS, which included studies 
that considered a scientific method to design a teaching methodology used in basic signal 
processing (Martinez-Torres, Garcia, Marin, & Vazquez, 2005), the spatial variation of 
species diversity (Cheng, 2004), techniques used by physiotherapists in Southeast Australia 
(Turner, 2002) and computer-based collaborative learning environments (Kealy, 2001). These 
studies have lead to the general conclusion that psychometric MDS concept mapping presents 
valid and robust concept maps. 
 
Study design 
The study was divided into three distinct phases (Table 2), designed to respond to the three 
research questions. 
 
Table 2 
Study design 
 
Phase Description Outcome 
One Knowledge categorisation Extracted list of security risk concepts 
½ 
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Two MDS knowledge structure Knowledge structure of security risk 
Three Expert knowledge structure validation Concept map of security risk 
 
Phase one: Knowledge categorisation 
The study commenced with Phase one and knowledge categorisation, where 104 English 
speaking institutions that offered tertiary security courses at undergraduate or postgraduate 
level were investigated and critiqued. Search methods to identify these courses used the 
world-wide-web, ASIS International (2007), Security Institute (Kidd, 2006), Australian 
University Guide (Good Guides, 2004) and Association of Universities and Colleges of 
Canada (2005). There was no limitation placed on the search criteria, as all institutions that 
offered security and allied industry courses were assessed (Table 3). In the world-wide-web 
search engines, typical data strings used were security; security course; security 
management. 
 
Table 3 
Location and number of security related courses 
 
Country of origin Institutions offering security related courses 
Australia 11 
Canada 8 
United Kingdom 5 
United States of America 74 
New Zealand 5 
South Africa 1 
Total 104 
 
Initial course selection was based on course title, supported by three industry and academic 
security experts. Further analysis reduced the number of courses to seven for content 
analysis. Once the final seven courses were selected for content analysis, course syllabi were 
sourced. Course syllabi included the course overview, and unit of study descriptions, 
objectives and content overview. Concept extraction commenced with an initial analysis of 
each critiqued course. Course structures were analysed for security and risk concepts, 
extracted using Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) text and content analysis 
(Pennebaker, Francis, & Booth, 2001). Course transcripts were sanitised, as generic study or 
research skills were not considered within the content analysis.  
 
Initial analysis resulted in 56 security risk concepts being extracted; however, the most used 
security risk concepts were required for knowledge mapping. Therefore, further analysis was 
undertaken and considered such aspects as word frequency, context and locality. In addition, 
convergence was applied using the Australian Risk Management Standard AS4360:2004 
(Standards Australia, 2004a), now ISO 3100:2009. Analysis resulted in a final security risk 
management category, with supporting subordinate concepts (Table 4). 
 
Table 4 
Risk management category and subordinate concepts 
 
Security risk management 
Analysis Assessment Calculate 
Communication Consequence Culture 
Decision Evaluation Loss 
Risk management Perception Probability 
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Risk Threat  
 
Phase two: Multidimensional scaling knowledge structure 
The second phase developed the multidimensional scaling (MDS) psychometric knowledge 
map of the security risk experts. To achieve this outcome, a number of steps were taken to 
analyse and present the security risk management knowledge map (Figure 3). 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Psychometric MDS concept mapping methodology 
 
Phase one data was inserted into the study’s survey instrument (see Figure 4 for a sample), 
embedded with the 14 security knowledge categories (Table 3). Participants selected, on a 
sliding scale, how similar or dissimilar they considered pairs of these security risk concepts. 
Non-probabilistic selected expert participants (N=29) made up the study’s sampling group. 
The sample size was selected to reduce the MDS STRESS1 measure (Cheng, 2004, p. 340; 
Cohen et al., 2002), but not exceeded due to the non-probability sampling method applied to 
expert selection. 
 
when compared to Similar 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Dissimilar 
Analysis   Assessment                         
Analysis   Calculate                         
Analysis   Communication                         
Analysis   Consequence                         
Analysis   Culture                         
etc   etc                         
 
Figure 4. Example of the MDS survey instrument 
 
The security risk management experts were selected by non-probability sampling and based 
on the study’s definition of expertise. As people gain domain knowledge, they may become 
more expert. Nevertheless expertise is not the exclusive gathering of information, moreover a 
rich understanding of knowledge, how that knowledge integrates into concepts and 
experience (Kellogg, 2003). Experts, unlike novice learners, understand domain knowledge 
in a hierarchical manner and have a more complex schema. This knowledge categorisation 
can be represented with concept maps, showing rich knowledge structure (Markham et al., 
1994). 
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For the study an initial number of Australian experts were sourced, based on their known 
standing in the security risk management community. Each expert was asked to recommend 
additional leading security risk management practitioners or academics. From the peer 
recommendations, these additional experts were contacted until the proposed study sampling 
size was attained. On contact, each expert was given a synopsis of the study and requested 
that they participate in the MDS concept mapping survey. The MDS survey was administered 
to the experts via a number of methods, dependant on geographical location of the expert 
from the researcher.  
 
Data was extracted from the sum of the experts’ MDS survey instrument responses 
(Cronbach’s Alpha α0.93), converted into a half-matrix and analysed using MDS. MDS 
ALSCAL analysis (STRESS1=0.28, RSQ=0.64) produced the spatial map (Figure 5), which 
required rotation and insertion of propositional statements. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Psychometric security risk management knowledge structure 
Notes: (comms = communications; cultrisk = cultural risk; intell = intelligence; psycho = perception; stats = 
statistics) 
 
The psychometric security risk structure (Figure 5) had both dimensional x and y axis data 
removed, leaving only knowledge structure (Figure 6). The structure was also rotated 
approximately 35°, locating the concept risk upper most as the most implicit concept. 
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Figure 6. MDS concept knowledge structure ready for propositional linkage insertion 
 
At this point, the MDS knowledge structure (Figure 6) was presented to experts (N=5) using 
a Delphi method. Each expert inserted propositional concept map links and labels in isolation 
to each other. Once this initial process was completed, the sum of the experts’ results was 
compared and only consensual links and labels retained. The process was then repeated until 
any subsequent changes were minimal or not supported by a consensus. Such a process led to 
the draft security risk management map, which was further validated in the following Phase 
three. 
 
Phase three: Expert knowledge structure validation 
Phase three used expert interviews (N=6) to assess the validity of the draft security risk 
management map. An expert interview survey instrument was developed to analyse and 
interpret the opinions of the experts regarding such aspects as the security risk map structure, 
inclusivity of security risk concepts and concept propositions. To complete the study, a 
comparative stage to triangulate (Cohen et al., 2002, pp. 112-115) between Phase one and 
Phase two outcomes followed, where the appropriateness of the MDS security risk 
management consensual map (Figure 7) was considered. 
 
Psychometric map of security risk management 
The study presented the psychometric security risk management map (Figure 7), which 
resulted in a number of interesting interpretations. Such interpretations included the central 
locality of the concept threat, the clustering of psychology risk concepts to threat, the 
outlying of risk assessment concepts such as probability and consequence, and the experts’ 
view that security risk management provided a quantitative analysis. 
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Figure 7. Psychometric security risk management concept map 
 
The psychometric security map presented threat at the spatial centre of the map, indicating 
that this concept is most related to the other measured concepts; a locality that was strongly 
supported by the Phase three experts. As one of the experts stated, “if there is no threat then 
there is no risk”, supported by another who proposed that “threat is a fundamental that drives 
[security] risk”. Such locality raised a number of issues, one being that for many years 
AS4360 risk management standard was the primary source for security practitioners and 
threat is not considered in this standard. Nevertheless, this issue has been addressed in 2006 
with the introduction of the Security Risk Management HB167:2006 handbook (Standards 
Australia, 2006). 
 
According to the map, threat also has a close relationship to both perception and culture. 
Such relationship considers that to some degree organisational background will define the 
level of perception to threat based on the cultural acceptability. In other words, that both 
perception and culture informs the level of threat that an individual, organisation, community 
or society will be willing to accept or not. As McGill, et al., states, “the threat component … 
is arguably the most uncertain aspect of the security risk problem” (2007, p. 1266), requiring 
subjective assumptions to forecast the intentions of potential adversaries. If threat is so 
uncertain, then its drivers of perception and cultural further complicates this issue. 
 
Many of the security risk management frameworks put forward in the introduction included 
the concepts of probability and consequence (Standards Australia, 2004a; Standards 
Australia, 2006). However, the security risk map presented these two concepts as relative 
outliers and not where one may expect these concepts to be located. A number of the 
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interviewed experts’ did raise this issue and suggested that these two concepts should be 
closer to analysis. The concept cluster of risk management, calculate, assessment and 
evaluation appears to indicate that the experts’ viewed security risk management as providing 
a quantitative or probabilistic analysis. Nevertheless, the participating experts all agreed that 
in general the two concepts of probability and consequence were suitably located. It may be 
suggested that experts’ consider the importance of threat and have some implicit 
understanding that these concepts cannot necessarily provide a wholly suitable measure. Cox 
suggests that by taking such a probabilities approach to assessing the action of intelligent 
antagonist may lead to errors in risk estimates (L. A. Cox, 2008, p. 1749). 
 
The study appeared to demonstrate a number of significant findings. These supported the 
research questions, with evidence to suggest that for the security risk management category: 
• MDS represented an appropriate technique to provide structure in the foundation of 
consensual knowledge maps. 
• Within the psychometric security risk map, the spatial localities of concepts provided an 
indication of conceptual interrelationships and relationships. 
• An appropriate consensual psychometric map of the security risk category and supporting 
subordinate concepts was presented (Figure 7). 
 
The security risk map structure, spatial representation and inclusion of the more significant 
security risk concepts provided evidence that the psychometric security risk management map 
appeared to represent an appropriate knowledge structure for the security category of risk 
management, strongly supported by the participating security experts. 
 
 
 
Recommendations 
The study outcomes lead to a series of recommendations in how the psychometric security 
risk management map informs understanding of security risk management and directs further 
inquiry. These recommendations suggest how the psychometric security risk management 
concept map may benefit both academia and professional understanding of security risk 
management including a greater understanding of expert knowledge structure, assist in 
developing a security body of knowledge, improved security directed pedagogy, better 
development of the unique risk domain of security risk management and security risk 
management application 
 
 Benefit of the psychometric security risk management concept map 
Security lacks definition (Tate, 1997) and yet is a distinct field of practice and study (ASIS 
International, 2003b; D.J. Brooks, 2009b). Supported by professional security bodies such as 
Risk Management Institute of Australasia (RMIA) (Talbot & Jakeman, 2008) and ASIS 
International (2009), security risk management is a unique knowledge category of security. 
Nevertheless, the security industry is a diverse and a speciality industry that has a 
requirement for both generic and domain specific skills (Hesse & Smith, 2001; Manunta, 
1996) and being a relatively young and emerging discipline, continues to expand (Fischer & 
Green, 2004; Tate, 1997). 
 
Risk management, as proposed by AS ISO 3100:2009, has been the primary methodological 
approach for security practitioners. In the past, the predecessor of AS ISO 31000:2009 was 
often considered “almost a de facto global standard” (Jay, 2005, p. 2) and has become an 
international template on dealing with risk. AS4360:2004 was used in diverse disciplines, 
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from finance to engineering and is used extensively by security and risk professionals across 
Australia (Beard & Brooks, 2006, p. 5; Jones & Smith, 2005, p. 2). 
 
As Standards Australia suggested in their handbook of security risk management, “the field 
of security risk management is rapidly evolving and as such this Handbook cannot cover all 
aspects and variant approaches” (2004d, p. 2). As the security risk management concept map 
has demonstrated, threat is a critical factor when considering security risk; however, AS ISO 
31000:2009 does not present the concept of threat or other security related concepts like 
vulnerability, even through this standard still remains a primary resource for security 
practitioners when considering and applying security risk management. 
 
The need to increase knowledge of security risk management can be shown through an 
Australian Federal Government supported initiative with the RMIA. These groups, among 
others, developed and in 2007 published the Security Risk Management Body of Knowledge 
SRBOK) guide for practitioners. The guide attempts to resolve security risk management 
elements such as “a framework for critical knowledge, competency and practice areas which 
managers, practitioners, students and academics alike can apply to recruit, train, educate and 
measure performance” (Risk Management Institute of Australasia, 2007b, p. 1). 
 
Most corporate security courses have been developed from related disciplines, being police, 
justice or criminology studies (Smith, 2001b; Tate, 1997), even through according to ASIS 
these disciplines should be separate and discrete from security (2003a, p. 4). At the tertiary 
level there is a lack of academic security programs, with most focused on criminal justice, 
crime prevention or risk management (Jay, 2005; Manunta, 1996, p. 235). This distortion of 
the corporate security discipline will result in security research that is not necessarily 
appropriate for the security industry. Security “is not merely a matter of intuition or common 
sense: it involves a complex body of knowledge, analytical abilities and know-how” 
(Simonsen, 1996, p. 229). 
 
Nevertheless, according to Smith, security knowledge is being established though the 
development of appropriate domain concepts (2001a, p. 32), which is supported by Simonsen 
who stated that the “body of knowledge of security has grown rapidly in the past decade” 
(1996, p. 230). Security risk management is one such knowledge category that is core to the 
corporate security discipline (D.J. Brooks, 2009b). The security risk management concept 
map provides a degree of specialised security body of knowledge. Understanding the risk and 
security risk management concepts that security experts consider when assessing security 
risk, how these concepts relate and integrate, and why security experts consider these ideas 
all support understanding. 
 
Further research 
The study has lead to the need for greater research in certain aspects of security risk 
management. It is important to further validate the importance of the concept threat within 
security risk management. For example, is this concept the core driver when completing 
security risk management, as opposed to more general risk management? 
 
The study used and measured the concept probability, as opposed to likelihood. The rationale 
behind the use of probability over likelihood was driven by the study’s methodology in 
Phases one and two i.e., probability was a more used concept. Nevertheless, some view 
likelihood (Standards Australia, 2004d) as being a more relevant concept for security risk 
management due to greater qualitative cogitation. Further measurement of the relationship 
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between these two concepts would be appropriate. In addition, the importance of 
vulnerability needs to be considered. 
 
The conceptual relationships put forward by the Australian Handbook (Standards Australia, 
2004c) and RMIA (Talbot & Jakeman, 2008) for Threat Assessment, Vulnerability 
Assessment and Criticality Assessment requires greater understanding. As this study has put 
forward, threat is a central and core concept for security risk management. Does this add 
greater weight in important to Threat Assessments, what is more or less important when 
considering security risk management and when considering Criticality Assessment, is 
criticality better understood and therefore managed as this may better relate to security 
consequence? 
 
Finally, the ability to validate the psychometric security risk management map needs to 
consider the study limitations. Further research could address this study’s limitations through 
aspects such as a greater sample size or by applying a different methodological approach. 
 
Methodological implications 
Methodological limitations of the study were identified and included the ability to provide a 
conclusive definition of security, missing concept of vulnerability, sample size and extracted 
data, the ability of multidimensional scaling (MDS) to develop cognitive knowledge 
structure, and the reliability and validity of the study. 
 
Defining security and its concepts 
A total of 104 tertiary security courses were selected and validated by security experts; 
however, security has no clear definition (Horvath, 2004; Manunta, 1999; Tate, 1997) and 
“means different things to different people” (Davidson, 2005, p. 73). According to Hesse and 
Smith, security is diverse, without a defined knowledge or skill structure (2001, p. 89). A 
view put forward by Brooks, who suggest that security can only be defined through 
contextual understanding (D.J. Brooks, 2009b). Therefore, homogeneity in the selection and 
validation of expert groups within the study may have introduced some degree of distortion. 
To address this concern independent resources were used for data triangulation, for example 
the ASIS International Academic/Practitioner Symposiums (ASIS International, 2003b; ASIS 
International, 2009). 
 
In considering the security risk management category, an additional subordinate concept of 
vulnerability could have been included in the psychometric map. Expert opinion indicated 
that this concept was a relatively important idea within security risk management. Such a 
view could also be suggested for the concept likelihood. Nevertheless, during study Phase 
one this concept was not identified and resulted in its exclusion. Therefore, the security risk 
management concept map has to be considered in the context of the homogeneity of the 
critiqued courses and expert validation groups. 
 
Sample size and course nature 
The study critiqued 104 tertiary security courses, resulting in a final analysis of seven 
courses. Since this critique there has been an increase in security undergraduate course 
offerings, with a claim that in the United States there are now “more than 300 two and four-
year institutions that participate with homeland security programs” (Davidson, 2005, p. 72). 
However, it could be argued that these may not necessarily be appropriate organisational 
security undergraduate courses. 
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For greater statistical confidence, the sample study size could have been larger. In addition, 
due to the non-probabilistic sampling approach, homogeneity of study participants and 
experts could have been experienced. Both factors may have resulted in some degree of error 
in the psychometric security risk management concept map. But in another MDS concept 
mapping study on reliability (Trochim, 1993) an average of 14.62 participants were used, 
with the conclusion that MDS “sample sizes half as large are nearly as good as the full-size 
values, suggesting that even smaller samples … may produce maps that fit almost as well as 
samples twice as large” (Trochim, 1993, p. 11). Therefore based on the supporting MDS 
knowledge mapping evidence and with the need to gain an appropriately valid MDS sample 
size, in general the sample sizes were considered appropriate. Nevertheless, conclusions 
made have to be considered within the context of the sample size, nature of non-probabilistic 
sampling and homogeneity. 
 
Cognitive knowledge structuring 
The study has demonstrated that an appropriate expert knowledge structure of security risk 
management can be presented; however, knowledge is dynamic, complex and implicit 
(Lockhart & Craik, 1990; Rennie & Gribble, 1999). Exemplar knowledge categorisation, 
indicates that concepts have relationship attributes based on similarity (Cohen et al., 2002, 
pp. 294-295). Nevertheless, the ability of proximal data to represent knowledge structure has 
been criticised, both in its ability to represent cognitive structure and to provide useful 
pedagogy information (Smith, 1984, p. 254). 
 
Reliability and validity of MDS concept mapping 
Reliability and validity were considered throughout the study, cognizant of the relatively high 
MDS goodness-of-fit (STRESS1) measure, although Cronbach’s Alpha reliability (α0.93), 
face and concurrent validity, and study triangulation all proved robust. MDS STRESS1 is a 
suitable MDS concept mapping measure — if a map achieved a value of less than 0.1 
(Johnson & Wichern, 2002, p. 702) — of both reliability and validity. However this study, 
achieved what Johnson and Wichern would consider an inappropriately high STRESS1 
(STRESS1=0.28, RSQ=0.64) measure. Nevertheless, this measure replicated findings of a 
similar larger MDS concept study (Trochim, 1993). In addition, Kealy (2001, p. 338) 
presented even higher STRESS1 results (STRESS1=0.36 to 0.35), with many other relevant 
MDS concept mapping studies not reporting their MDS goodness-of-fit measures (Lockhart 
& Craik, 1990; Markham et al., 1994; Martinez-Torres et al., 2005). Therefore, this study’s 
STRESS1 was considered suitable, support from comparable MDS concept mapping studies. 
 
Conclusion 
Risk management and security risk management have flourished over the past decade and are 
relied upon to provide robust and informed mitigation strategies to protect people, 
information and assets. However, most risk management standards provide a framework or 
process that takes a probabilistic approach to risk management, perhaps not wholly suitable 
for security. This article has presented many of the Australian approaches to risk and security 
risk management, such as the ISO 31000:2009 risk management standard, Handbook 
AS436:2006 and the RMIA SRMBOK. Nevertheless, these frameworks or processes do not 
necessarily provide an in-depth understanding to security risk management and its uniqueness 
from risk management. 
 
Using an interpretive approach with the foundation theories of knowledge categorisation, 
concept mapping and multidimensional scaling (MDS), this study has presented an experts’ 
consensual psychometric map of security risk management. The study was divided into three 
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distinct phases, each informing the proceeding phase. The first phase critiqued 104 security 
courses and from these, tabulated the most subordinate security risk management concepts 
(N=14). These concepts were embedded into the MDS instrument to produce the spatial 
psychometric knowledge structure of security risk management, from which the final security 
risk management concept map was developed. 
 
The psychometric security risk management map (Figure 7) presented a number of interesting 
aspects, such as the central locality of threat, the clustering of psychology risk concepts and 
the interrelationship of probabilistic analysis to security risk management. Threat was 
fundamental to security risk management, driven by an individual’s perception and the 
organisational culture. Probability, consequence and analysis were clustered together and 
remote from the other general risk concepts, indicating that such a quantitative or 
probabilistic approach to security risk management may not be wholly suitable. 
 
The psychometric security risk management map was developed and tested at every stage of 
the study, with indications that it was both reliable and valid. Such a map will benefit 
academia and industry understanding of security risk management, leading to improved 
frameworks, processes, teaching and learning. The map has shown the uniqueness of security 
risk management to risk management and augmented implicit understanding of experts in this 
complex risk domain. 
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